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ATTITUDES ABOUT ATTITUDES 
Michael J. Gerhardt* 
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED. 
By Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. 2002. Pp. xix, 459. Paper, $25. 
INTRODUCTION 
Attitudes about the Supreme Court differ sharply, particularly 
among academics. Law professors believe the Constitution and other 
laws constrain the Court, while most political scientists do not. These 
different perspectives on justices' fidelity to the law1 ensure that legal 
scholars and political scientists have little to say about the Court that 
is of interest to each other. 
As a result, it should not be surprising that most legal scholars are 
unfamiliar with Harold Spaeth2 and Jeffrey Segal,3 the two political 
scientists most closely associated with the view that the law does not 
constrain the justices from voting their policy preferences. Building on 
social psychology research and theory, Spaeth initially constructed and 
Segal later joined in refining the so-called attitudinal model. In several 
publications including a classic book published in 1993,4 Spaeth and 
Segal ("the authors") explain and demonstrate the empirical support 
for their model as holding that justices decide cases on the basis of 
their personal attitudes about social policy and not on the basis of any 
genuine fidelity to law. In 1999, the authors empirically demonstrated 
that precedent did not constrain the justices from voting their policy 
* Arthur B. Hanson Professor, William & Mary Law School. B.A. 1978, Yale; M.Sc. 
1979, London School of Economics; J.D. 1982, University of Chicago. - Ed. Thanks to 
Barry Friedman, Mark Graber, Ron Kahn, and the participants in a William & Mary Law 
School workshop for helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
1. See generally Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of 
Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 251,280-84 (1997) (contrasting 
the "internal" and "external" perspectives on the Jaw). 
2. Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University. 
3. Professor of Political Science, State University of New York at Stony Brook. 
4. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). 
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preferences.5 This and other research have made the authors lighten-
ing rods among political scientists who study the Court. 
Spurred by their zealous commitment to the attitudinal model and 
their notoriety among political scientists, the authors revised their 
classic work to update its empirical foundation and to respond to their 
critics. The revised work constitutes their most extensive challenge yet 
to skeptics of the attitudinal model. 
In this Review, I assess the renewed claim about the attitudinal 
model's superiority in explaining and predicting the Court's decisions. 
After reviewing the book's basic arguments in Part I, I examine in Part 
II the critique of competing models. The major problem with this 
critique is its failure to appraise other models in their strongest forms. 
The authors insist other models satisfy the rigid criteria for scientific 
inquiry - i.e., they should posit falsifiable propositions - even 
though each is supported by other, common social-science research 
strategies. 
Part III examines the attitudinal model's major limitations. First, 
it vainly seeks to objectify and quantify inherently subjective data. 
Second, it cannot explain short- or long-term change in constitutional 
law. It assumes mistakenly that all justices have fixed preferences 
when first appointed and that the categories for demarcating ideolo-
gies are constant. 
Part IV suggests future research to perfect the attitudinal model. 
These suggestions include tracking extensively the connection be-
tween justices' backgrounds and decisions; assessing the implications 
of the Court's judgments configured as standards or rules, which help 
to explain their unpredictability; and tracing the patterns of decisions 
and precedent's functions in constitutional adjudication. Researching 
these questions is likely to support greater coordination of competing 
models of the Court. A synthetic model conceivably holds the greatest 
promise of comprehensively explaining the Court's decisions. 
I. REVISITING THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
The authors' new book significantly revises and updates two 
themes explored in their earlier research. The first theme is the failure 
of non-attitudinal models to explain and predict the Supreme Court's 
decisions. In earlier works, the authors posited a simplistic version of 
the legal model as mechanically controlling legal interpretation and 
permitting no indeterminacy.6 In their revised book, they analyze the 
legal model as "the belief that, in one form or another, the decisions of 
the Court are' substantially influenced by the facts of the case in light 
5. See HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY 
WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999). 
6. See. e.g., id. at 8-9. 
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of the plain meaning of statutes and the Constitution, the intent of the 
framers, and/or precedent" (p. 48; citation omitted). Their analysis 
includes critiquing Ronald Dworkin's view that "stare decisis plays a 
vital role in judicial decision-making. "7 Dworkin argues the quest to 
find a fit between past cases and a "hard" one in which no preexisting 
rule of law exists leads judges to "eliminate interpretations that some 
judges would otherwise prefer, so that the brute facts of legal history 
will in this way limit the role any judge's personal concoctions can play 
in his decisions."8 The authors suggest, however, that Dworkin's (and 
others') conception of the law fails to meet the exacting standards of 
scientific research, because it is not ~'falsifiable .... [T]he model must 
be able to state a priori the potential conditions that, if observed, 
would refute the model" (p. 46). Because the legal model posits no 
such conditions, it is irrefutable. 
Drawing on prior research, the authors consider: 
[T]he best evidence for the influence of precedent must come from Uus-
tices who dissented] from the majority opinion ... under question, for we 
know that these justices disagree with the precedent. If the precedent es-
tablished in the case influences them, that influence should be felt in that 
case's progeny, through their votes and opinion writing. Thus, determin-
ing the influence of precedent requires examining the extent to which 
justices who disagree with a precedent move toward that position in sub-
sequent cases. (p. 292) 
The authors searched 2418 votes and cases for evidence of the "gravi-
tational force" of precedent that they believe is claimed by Dworkin,9 
the " 'respect for precedent' " Ronald Kahn claims justices exhibit, 10 
or the validity of Herman Pritchett's "statement that " '[j]udges make 
choices, but they are not the 'free' choices of congressmen.' " 11 In 
categorizing attitudes towards precedent, the authors treated justices 
who supported challenged precedents as "precedentialists" (ranging 
from strong to weak) and justices who did not as "preferentialists" 
(ranging from strong to weak) (p. 296). They further broke down cases 
into "ordinary" and "landmark" cases as rated by Congressional 
Quarterly's Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court (p. 295). Their data 
showed that "[t]he justices are rarely influenced by stare decisis" (p. 
7. P. 50 (discussing RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, 
LAW'S EMPIRE]). 
8. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 7, at 255. 
9. /d. at 401. 
10. P. 288 (quoting Ronald Kahn, Interpretive Norms and Supreme Court Decision-
Making: The Rehnquist Court on Privacy and Religion, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-
MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 175 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gill-
man eds., 1999)). 
11. P. 298 (quoting C. Herman Pritchett, The Development of Judicial Research, in 
FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH 42 (Grossman & Tanenhaus eds., 1969) (alteration in 
original)). 
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298). It demonstrated "beyond doubt ... that the modern Supreme 
Courts, heavily criticized for their activism, did not invent or even 
perfect preferential behavior; it has been with us since Washington 
packed the Court with Federalists" (p. 300). The few precedentialist 
acts are irrelevant because they are 
more likely to be found in cases of the lowest salience: ordinary cases 
compared with landmark cases and, among ordinary cases, statutory 
cases over constitutional cases and modern economic cases over modern 
civil liberties cases. The influence of precedent appears to be quite mi-
nor, but it does not appear to be completely idiosyncratic. (p. 306) 
Indeed, "not one justice of the Rehnquist Court exercised deference 
to precedent by voting to uphold both conservative and liberal prece-
dents" (p. 310). 
A second model derives from rational-choice theory, which the 
authors did not address in their earlier book. They identify "two 
camps" of rational-choice theorists who study the Court (p. 100). The 
first is "an internal camp that focuses on the interactions among the 
justices" to facilitate or achieve the maximization of their collective 
satisfaction (p. 100). 
Equilibria ... are crucial to most rational choice theorists. They repre-
sent "a prediction, for a prespecified circumstance, about the choices of 
people and the corresponding outcomes. This prediction generally takes 
the form of 'if the institutional context of a choice is ... and if people's 
preferences are ... then the only choices and outcomes that can endure 
are ... .'" (pp. 99-100; citation omitted, ellipsis in original) 
Thus, equilibrium theory "provid[ es] necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for choices to occur" (p. 100). The authors acknowledge other 
theorists - principally Lee Epstein and Jack Knight - who "dispute 
the centrality of equilibrium analysis for rational-choice models, 
labeling the positions taken by each side of the debate a play 'to its 
competitive advantage' " (p. 100; internal citation omitted). Never-
theless, the authors consider equilibrium theory as the "most powerful 
tool and is clearly the comparative advantage that rational-choice the-
ory has over other theories" (p. 100) because it provides the means by 
which to construct falsifiable models of strategic behavior by "demon-
strat[ing] that interactions among the justices constitute a best 
response to a best response, or alternative equilibrium solutions" (p. 
102). Rational-choice theorists mistakenly infer strategies from the 
outcomes achieved in particular cases, even though this is circular; and 
they "allow [justices to pursue] any goals whatsoever," making every 
objective achieved rational (p. 111). 
The second camp of rational-choice theorists focuses on con-
straints imposed on the Court by political actors. These theorists favor 
separation-of-powers models, which "examine the degree to which the 
courts must defer to legislative majorities in order to prevent overrides 
that result in policy worse than what the court might have achieved 
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through more sophisticated behavior" (p. 103). In the authors' judg-
ment, the best of these works is Brian Marks's study of a statutory 
case in which "the justices simply voted their ideal points." 12 Other 
separation-of-powers models are undermined by flawed assumptions, 
including "that the Court will construe legislation as close to its ideal 
point as possible without getting overturned by Congress" (p. 105); 
"the justices have perfect and complete information about the prefer-
ences of Congress" (p. 106); disallowing "the Court from bundling 
issues" (p. 107); treating legislation overturning decisions "as costless" 
(p. 107); and "always giv[ing] Congress the final move" (p. 108). The 
most serious problem with these models is their uniform treatment of 
"judicial preferences as if they were exogenously determined" (p. 
109). 
The final model rejected by the authors is postpositivism, some-
times called the new institutionalism. This model 
make claims, not about the predictable behavior of judges, but about 
their state of mind - whether they are basing their decisions on honest 
judgments about the meaning of law. What is post-positivist about this 
version is the assumption that a legal state of mind does not necessarily 
mean obedience to conspicuous rules; instead, it means a sense of obliga-
tion to make the best decision possible in light of one's general training 
and sense of professional obligation. On this view, decisions are consid-
ered legally motivated if they represent a judge's sincere belief that their 
decision represents their best understanding of what the law re-
quires .... "[J]udging in good faith" is all we can expect of judges.13 
Postpositivists reject the need to construct a falsifiable model based on 
their belief "that doing [empirical] tests has the effect of changing the 
concept of 'legal influence' so that it no longer represents what they 
believe"14 are significant errors. Nevertheless, "virtually any decision 
can be consistent with the legal model. And any decision is consistent 
with the model as long as the judge has sincerely convinced him- or 
herself that the decision is legally appropriate" (pp. 432-33). The post-
positivist model also "fails to appreciate the fundamental influence of 
motivated reasoning in human decision making" (p. 433), i.e., it fails to 
recognize people invariably convince themselves of the rationality of 
what they are doing. 
12. P. 104 (quoting BRIAN A. MARKS, A MODEL OF JUDICIAL INFLUENCE ON 
CONGRESSIONAL POLICYMAKING: GROVE CITY COLLEGE V. BELL 88-7 (Hoover Institu-
tion, Stanford University, Working Papers in Political Science No. P-88-7, 1981 )). 
13. P. 432 (quoting Howard Gillman, What's Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behav-
iora/ists Test the "Legal Model" of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 465, 
486 (2001) (internal citations omitted)); see also p. 48 n.12 ("To post-positive legalists, the 
only required influence of law is a subjective influence that resides within the justice's own 
mind."). 
14. P. 433 n.8 (quoting Gillman, supra note 13, at 485). 
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The second theme of the book is the claim that the attitudinal 
model best explains and predicts Supreme Court decisions. The 
authors describe the "the ideological considerations that have moti-
vated the thrust of the Court's decisions since its inception" (p. xvi). 
They also proclaim Bush v. Gore15 as proof for their model, for "one 
may accurately say that never in its history has a majority of the Court 
behaved in such a blatantly politically partisan fashion" (p. 171 ). The 
decision stands out because the majority upheld for the first time an 
equal protection claim without any "showing [of] purposeful intent to 
discriminate" (p. 172). The majority "produc[ed] an arrogantly anti-
states' rights decision" in spite of its frequently professed concerns for 
state sovereignty (p. 174). Its transparency is further evident in eight 
cases over a four-and-a-half-year period in which a bare majority of 
the Rehnquist Court struck down federal laws for violating state 
sovereignty in spite of the decisions' complete detachment from con-
stitutional text, history, and precedent. 16 The authors believe the only 
explanation for these decisions is the majority's preferences to "for-
malistically redefin[ e] federal-state relationships" in order to curtail 
congressional efforts to implement social policies with which the 
justices disagree and to preserve certain power relationships within the 
states (p. 174 ). 
The authors further claim that "[ o ]nly the attitudinal model's 
explanation [of Court decisions] is well supported by systematic 
empirical evidence" (p. 351). Throughout the book, they draw on the 
extraordinary database that they have assembled on the justices' 
backgrounds, nominating presidents, supporting and opposing sena-
tors, and the procedural histories and outcomes of the Court's 
decisions. Thus, their aggregate analysis of data on Supreme Court 
nominations and confirmations leads to their finding that: 
[A] nominee's reception [in the Senate] hinges on the characteristics of 
the nominee and the composition of the Senate. So, too, the context of a 
nomination strongly influences the outcome. The strength and popularity 
of the President emerge as important determinants of individual votes. In 
addition, the relative mobilization of interest groups around a nominee 
also has pronounced effects. (p. 222) 
Based on reversal and prediction strategies of the justices' voting on 
certiorari petitions, the authors found that: 
15. 531 u.s. 98 (2000). 
16. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 
706 (1999); Coli. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coli. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 
627 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Idaho v. Coeur d'Arlene Tribe, 521 
U.S. 261 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 
u.s. 549 (1995). 
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The link that connects the various factors that determine who gets into 
the Supreme Court are the individual justices' personal policy goals. 
Given the freedom to select for review such cases as they wish, the fac-
tors that govern selection and the strategies that the various justices em-
ploy in voting to review a case are matters of individual determination. 
(p.276) 
Based on their careful coding and tracking of the justices' votes in 
landmark and ordinary cases, they found " 'crisis' stare decisis" 
in which "the decision to overturn precedent is conditioned on the 
ideological direction of the precedent being overturned" (p. 311). 
Based on bivariant and multivariant analyses of coalition formation 
and opinion assignments, they determined "justices are capable of 
engaging in sophisticated behavior in arenas [such as voting on certio-
rari] where sophisticated voting clearly makes sense" (p. 350). 
Unlike the decision on the merits, coalition formation takes place in an 
inherently interactive environment, as both attitudinal and rational 
choice based works have demonstrated. Nevertheless, the sincere prefer-
ences of the justices go a long way toward explaining their decisions [to 
write separately or join others' opinions], while interactive factors such 
as influence do not. (p. 404; footnotes omitted) 
Indeed, "influence," or the ability of other justices to persuade others 
to join their opinions, "seems to be a function of like-mindedness" (p. 
404). Nor did the authors find any evidence indicating that public 
opinion influences decisions. Moreover, the aggregated votes of indi-
vidual justices on the Rehnquist Court indicate that, "[o]utside of sup-
port for the Solicitor General (including agency cases), [concerns 
about judicial restraint] are either imperceptible or explained by the 
justices substantive policy preferences" (p. 428). 
Near the end of their book, the authors propose future research on 
the Court, including determining whether the "sequential process 
of certiorari voting lead[s] to a signaling game," the extent of the 
opinion-writer's influence in shaping outcomes, the extent to which 
lower courts "tailor[] [their] preferences to the Court median" in spite 
of an arguably controlling Supreme Court precedent written "off the 
median," the extent of median justices' influence in shaping the 
reasoning or outcomes of Court decisions, and whether "the structural 
features of the American political system [can] lead to a compelling 
formal model of rationally sincere behavior on the merits for the 
justices, even in statutory cases" (pp. 434-35). 
II. THE LIMITS OF THE ATTITUDINAL CRITIQUE 
This Part assesses the authors' critique of other models of the 
Supreme Court. If the critique fails, the attitudinal model can no 
longer claim exclusive capacity to explain and predict judicial deci-
sions. 
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A. The Legal Model 
The major problem with the critique of the legal model is no such 
legal model exists. The authors' description of the legal model does 
not correspond to legal scholars' conception of law. They have never 
purported to construct a formal model of legal reasoning, much less a 
scientific one. The authors concede as much when they chastise legal 
scholars for refusing to construct a model akin to that which scientists 
employ. 
This refusal is common among social scientists. In fact, 
legal scholarship frequently pursues doctrinal, interpretive, and norma-
tive purposes rather than empirical ones. Legal scholars often are just 
playing a different game than the empiricists play, which means that no 
amount of insistence on the empiricists' rules can indict legal scholarship 
- any more than strict adherence to the rules of baseball supports an in-
dictment of cricket. 17 
Other fields, such as presidential studies, employ similar methods. 18 
Moreover, the authors' "empirical methodology blinds them to legal 
scholarship's internal perspective" or legal scholars' efforts to explain 
the process by which judges and justices "interpret" the law. 19 The 
internal perspective includes methods for criticizing the coherence of 
different interpretative methodologies. The authors ignore, however, 
arguments over methodology. They fail to appreciate how legal schol-
ars and judges critique alternative interpretive approaches based on 
their internal coherence and achievement of their stated objectives. 
Thus, Dworkin's account of legal reasoning is evaluated on how 
it makes sense of data on judging and compares with alternative 
explanations.20 
17. Jack Goldsmith & Adrien Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal Scholarship, 
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 153-54 (2002). 
18. For a sampling of works in presidential studies relying on doctrinal, interpretive, and 
normative analyses rather than empirical analysis, see FRED I. GREENSTEIN, THE 
PRESIDENTIAL DIFFERENCE: LEADERSHIP STYLE FROM FOR TO CLINTON 5 (2000) (fo-
cusing on "the leadership qualities of each of the presidents from FOR to Bill Clinton and 
their significance for the public and the political community"); SIDNEY M. MILKIS & 
MICHAEL NELSON, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 1776-1998 
(3d ed. 1999) (offering interpretive political history of the presidency); and STEPHEN 
SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO 
GEORGE BUSH (1993) (assessing presidents as agents of political change by tracing the "in-
tercurrence of the basic types of political leadership with expansion and diversification of the 
institutional universe of presidential action"). See also PRESIDENTIAL POWER: FORGING 
THE PRESIDENCY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Robert Y. Shapiro et al. eds., 2000) 
(commentaries on the methodologies employed in studying the presidency from Richard 
Neustadt's classic work in the field to recent scholarship). 
19. Goldsmith & Vermeule, supra note 17, at 154. 
20. See, e.g., p. 298 (suggesting that "[t]he levels of precedential behavior that we find in 
the U.S. Supreme Court are simply not consistent with the sort of arguments we find, for 
example, in Dworkin, Kahn, or any of the other legalists that we have discussed"). For a 
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The authors' external perspective leads them to distort the law 
repeatedly. For instance, variations in judicial votes might not be evi-
dence of hypocrisy but rather demonstrate that "what they call 'sub-
jective preferences' may be nothing more than honest attempts to 
apply consistent interpretive philosophy to the facts. "21 They also 
discount the fact that the Court decides hard cases. "Virtually none of 
the disputes that reach the Court are easy cases. Most of them concern 
issues for which sources of legal authority - constitutional text, origi-
nal understanding, evolving tradition, precedent - do not yield 
determinate answers. "22 The Court's docket consists of cases in which 
no source points to a simple or obvious answer. In the close cases that 
get to the Court, ideology arguably plays a significant role in shaping 
the justices' attitudes towards, or manipulation of, legal materials. Yet, 
the pertinent ideology is not the same as partisan attitudes. It is judi-
cial ideology, which entails a perspective on federal judges' role in the 
constitutional order.23 The authors never systematically track or 
examine the significance of such ideology. 
Four other examples further illustrate the authors' distortions. The 
first is their insistence that Bush v. Gore constitutes "the most egre-
gious example of judicial policy making" ever (p. 2). Curiously, they 
fail to acknowledge that many legal scholars would agree. Even so, the 
claim is dubious, because seven justices- including Clinton appointee 
Stephen Breyer - upheld Bush's equal protection claim and conse-
quently agreed to reverse the Florida Supreme Court's ruling that 
preserved Vice-President Gore's challenge to Florida Secretary of 
State Kathleen Harris's certification of the Florida election in Bush's 
favor. This was a bipartisan coalition of justices who supported Bush's 
claim. Nor do the authors acknowledge the implications of the Florida 
Supreme Court's failure to take advantage of an available basis in the 
law upon which to insulate its judgment from Supreme Court review, a 
failure that prompted a unanimous decision by the Court24 that pro-
vided the state supreme court with the chance to clarify an "independ-
commentary on how best to evaluate Dworkin's scholarship, see Edward J. McCaffery, 
Ronald Dworkin, Inside-Out, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1043 (1997). 
21. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model, 4 LAW & Crs. 
6, 7 (1994). 
22. Vincent Blasi, Praise for the Court's Unpredictability, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1986, at 
A23. 
23. See generally Should Ideology Matter?: Judicial Nominations 2001: Hearing Before 
the Senate Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 107th Cong. App. (2001) (special hearing explaining the relevance of ideology to judi-
cial selection). 
24. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) .. 
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ent and adequate" basis for its initial judgment in Florida election 
law.25 
Moreover, the authors' claim that the majority's ruling contra-
dicted their usual preference to rule in favor of state sovereignty 
demonstrates a lack of understanding of the implications of the 
Court's ruling. The seven-member majority voted to leave the final 
word on the outcome of the Florida election not to federal judges but 
rather to the state's political authorities. The ultimate winners in the 
case were not the justices (in fortifying the scope of federal judicial 
review over state-court judgments) but rather the state political 
authorities in managing Gore's challenge.26 
Second, the authors distort the Court's decision striking down 
the Line Item Veto Act.27 They suggest that the argument that the 
Constitution does not define "bill" and otherwise says nothing about 
what the President may veto should have controlled the case. The 
strongest argument for supporting the act, however, was that it satis-
fied the nondelegation doctrine,28 i.e., Congress furnished "intelligible 
principles" that the President was bound to follow. The question in the 
case was whether Congress could delegate to the President limited 
authority to cancel specific appropriations measures, not whether he 
had inherent authority to do so. 
The authors also fail to acknowledge the significance of the 
dissent. They mention the vote was six to three, but they neglect to 
mention that Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, and 
Stephen Breyer were the dissenters.29 There is no obvious ideological 
common ground among these justices. They dissented, not because of 
constitutional silence or failure to define "bill," but rather because of 
their agreement that the statute satisfied the Constitution's nondelega-
tion doctrine. 
25. For example, in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983), the Court 
explained that "when ... a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal 
law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of 
any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the 
most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it 
believed that federal law required it to do so." 
26. The authors refer mistakenly to three justices "overrul[ing]" the Florida Supreme 
Court. P. 1. They are referring to the Chief Justice's separate concurrence, joined by two 
other justices. Six justices refused to join this concurrence and thus endorse its peculiar con-
struction of Article II as vesting state legislatures with exclusive authority to determine the 
procedures for presidential elections. 
27. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
28. See A. L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
29. Seep. 170; Clinton, 524 U.S. at 484-90 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by O'Connor, J., 
and Scalia, J.) (arguing that the act satisfied the nondelegation doctrine). 
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Third, the authors ignore legal justifications for many other cases.30 
The authors exclude unanimous opinions from their data set on the 
justices' fidelity to precedent because these opinions lack the friction 
that presumably provides the impetus for justices to express their 
respective policy preferencesY Unanimity is hard, however, to square 
with a critique of the legal model that suggests the justices never, or 
almost never, make decisions based on legal variables. Even worse for 
the critique of the legal model is that many unanimous and nearly 
unanimous opinions involve salient issues on which the justices tran-
scend their ideological differences to reach agreement about the law.32 
Fourth, there are problems with the authors' claim that there is 
no "better example of judicial doublespeak" (p. 11) than Printz v. 
United States33 in which the Court struck down the Brady Handgun 
Prevention Act's requirement that local authorities conduct back-
ground checks on prospective handgun purchasers. The authors mis-
takenly assert the Court struck down the entire act; it did not. It spe-
cifically overruled the provision mandating local officials to implement 
federal policy. The Court's decision arose from the "structure of the 
Constitution,"34 which the authors regard as completely detached from 
the text, and as mere subterfuge allowing the majority to obfuscate its 
real intent. The idea that drawing inferences from the structure is 
"doublespeak" is astounding. Structural design is, as Charles Black 
suggested, arguably the most significant source of constitutional 
meaning, and one whose legitimacy has been recognized by every 
30. Every case that is explicable on the basis of some legal variable is inconsistent with 
the attitudinal model. See, e.g., infra note 32 and accompanying text. 
31. Seep. 295 ("We exclude ... unanimously decided cases. Only dissenters can be con-
flicted between their stated preferences and the precedent the majority established in that 
case."). 
32. See, e.g., Eldred v. Aschroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (upholding, seven to two, Con-
gress's repeated extensions of the rights of copyright ownership in spite of constitutional 
language allowing Congress to do so for "limited terms"); Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 
(2000) (unanimously upholding Congress's power to bar states from disclosing or selling per-
sonal information required for drivers' licenses); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (reinvig-
orating, seven to two, the Privileges or Immunities clause); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 
(1997) (unanimously holding that sitting presidents are not entitled to any immunity from 
civil lawsuits based on their unofficial misconduct); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 
(1996) (ruling seven to one Virginia Military Academy's policy of excluding women as stu-
dents violated equal protection); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (unanimously 
agreeing that the Court lacked the power to review the constitutionality of the procedures 
employed by the Senate in judicial impeachment trials); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 
(1988) (upholding the constitutionality of the Independent Counsel Act eight to one); 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (unanimously holding presidents not entitled to 
an absolute executive privilege that would have allowed them unilateral discretion over 
whether to comply with otherwise lawful subpoenas). 
33. 521 u.s. 898 (1997). 
34. Printz, 521 U.S. at 918-25. 
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justice, regardless of ideological preference.35 Indeed, the concept of 
separation of powers to which the authors frequently refer is an infer-
ence from it.36 There is nothing principled about a critique that rejects 
an inference as a contrivance but then employs it when it suits the 
critics' purposes.37 
The authors' dismissal of the "structure of the Constitution" as 
socialized contrivance is unfair. They presume that socialization has 
blinded the justices to accept clearly correct answers to constitutional 
questions, though they never stitch a coherent methodology together. 
The authors' claim also lacks any empirical support - it violates the 
rules of inference, which, as the next Section shows, some scholars 
insist is indispensable for empirical research in social science. 
B. The Rational-Choice Model 
There are many problems with the authors' critique of rational-
choice models. First, their critique is not directed at arguably the most 
significant work done on the Court by rational choice theorists. The 
authors suggest that "the most prominent of the recent rational choice 
works on the Supreme Court" are problematic because they do not at-
tempt, or fail when they do attempt, to measure equilibrium predic-
tions (p. 102). Yet, they also mention that Lee Epstein and Jack 
Knight dispute "the centrality of equilibrium analysis for rational 
choice models" (p. 100). The authors never explain why they "agree 
with Epstein and Knight that equilibrium analysis is not the only way 
to 'do' rational choice theory" (p. 100). The sparse discussion of 
Epstein and Knight is likely to leave readers with the false impression 
that Epstein and Knight's work is insignificant. Yet, Epstein's scholar· 
ship on her own, with Knight, and with others, are probably the best 
known among rational-choice models of the Court. Her major thesis is 
that the justices are not completely free to vote their policy prefer-
ences but rather operate within a specific institutional environment 
that sometimes constrains the justices to take various factors into con-
35. See CHARLES BLACK, STRUCfURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
(1969). 
36. See, e.g., pp. 18-20, 22, 43, 231. 
37. The authors further condemn the majority opinion for rejecting practices 
dating back to the first Congress .... As Federalist 27 argues, "The legislatures, courts, and 
magistrates, of the respective members, will be incorporated into the operations of the na-
tional government as far as its just and constitutional authority extends; and will be rendered 
auxiliary to the enforcement of its law." While The Federalist is not fundamental law, we are 
aware of no Supreme Court decision that more directly contradicts an explicit statement 
from the Papers. 
P. 174; internal citation omitted. 
The authors do not acknowledge that the majority cited the passage but did not find it 
determinative because it failed to address the question before the Court - whether the 
handgun law exceeded Congress's "constitutional authority." 
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sideration, such as the norm of stare decisis, when formulating strate-
gies to implement their objectives.38 
The clash between the attitudinal model and Epstein and Knight's 
work is most apparent in the authors' discussion of the extent to which 
precedent genuinely constrains the justices from voting their policy 
preferences. In an earlier article, Epstein and Knight argued that 
"precedent can serve as a constraint on justices acting on their per-
sonal policy preferences."39 Although judges and justices might prefer 
to ignore precedent in favor of their preferred policies, they are con-
strained by the utility of precedent in fostering social stability and ju-
dicial legitimacy. Others might react negatively if the Court violated 
precedent. In support of the significance of precedent in judicial 
decisionmaking, Epstein and Knight pointed to the ubiquity of cita-
tions to precedent in published judicial opinions as well as in the 
arguments of litigants and the private discussions of the justices them-
selves. The authors responded that ubiquity was not influence. 
Moreover, they claimed the evidence, on which Epstein and Knight 
relied, actually demonstrated that the justices felt little social pressure 
to adhere to precedents.40 The authors' quarrel is less with Epstein and 
Knight's empirical methods than with the implications of their data. 
Moreover, they cite, but do not discuss, other work consistent with 
Epstein's approach, demonstrating, for example, that standing doc-
trine is the culmination of the justices' strategic decision making to 
create some barriers on the abilities of ideological plaintiffs to 
manipulate the Court's docket.41 
Moreover, a crucial dimension of Epstein's and others' rational-
choice models is their agreement with Ferejohn and Weingast's insight 
that "there is no 'last word' in politics."42 This dynamic ensures there is 
no point of equilibrium attainable in the political process. At best, the 
justices never cease to try to gain some competitive advantage over 
the other branches until the wheel turns and the power relationship 
among them alters. 
The second, related difficulty is that Epstein has been as critical as 
the authors with respect to legal scholars' methodological laxity. For 
38. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICE JUSTICES MAKE (1998). For 
some perspective, see FOREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME 
COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000), which examines the ways in which intracourt bar-
gaining affects the opinion-writing process. 
39. Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1018, 
1021 (1996). 
40. Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, Norms, Dragons, and Stare Decisis: A Re-
sponse, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1064-82 (1996). 
41. P. 435 (citing MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL 
CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (2000) ). 
42. P. 108 (quoting John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statu-
tory Interpretation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 263,263 (1992)). 
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instance, she and Gary King argued that legal scholars generally fail to 
follow the rules used in natural and social science for drawing infer-
ences from empirical research.43 They insisted, inter alia, that legal 
scholars need to draw and define data properly and provide guidance 
for drawing conclusions from the data and hypotheses tested. Epstein 
and King cautioned against drawing broad inferences from limited 
data. They objected that legal research often contains "stridently 
stated, but overly confident, conclusions"44 that go well beyond what 
the research will support. They cautioned legal scholars further not to 
be "definitive,"45 but "rather to estimate the degree of uncertainty 
inherent in each conclusion and to report this estimate along with 
every conclusion" to be the degree of uncertainty inherent in their 
conclusions.46 
Epstein and King's critique of legal scholars' empirical ignorance 
can, however, be turned against the attitudinal model.47 The authors 
suggest the Court's activism in striking down a historic number of fed-
eral laws within the past five years shows the justices' willingness to 
substitute their judgment for that of Congress, but the authors draw 
the wrong inference. None of these cases, with the possible exception 
of United States v. Morrison,48 involved salient issues likely to provoke 
congressional retaliation. In these cases, the Court only struck down 
specific provisions within the laws they reviewed that extended their 
reach to the states. Congress was rarely faced with having to reenact 
these statutes in full. The application of these laws to the states is not a 
salient issue for Congress because most Americans do not appear to 
care about the implications of Congress's inability to subject the states 
to various regulatory schemes. 
Moreover, the authors draw the wrong inferences from their data 
on legal reasoning. At most, the data show a consistency between out-
comes and justices' policy preferences, but the only plausible inference 
to draw from these data is that it does not rule out the possibility that 
justices decide some cases consistent with their ideological prefer-
ences. The data do not show legal variables are not factors in the jus-
tices' decisions. 
The third problem is that the authors often agree with rational-
choice theory's insights. The agreement is hard to square with their 
43. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
44. /d. at 7. 
45. /d. at 52. 
46. /d. at 50. 
47. See, e.g., Frank Cross et al., Above the Rules: A Response to Epstein and King, 69 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 135 (2002). 
48. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (overturning the civil remedies provision of the Violence 
Against Women Act). 
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repeated dismissal of the utility of rational-choice theory. Yet, they 
agreed that "justices are capable of engaging in sophisticated behavior 
in arenas where sophisticated voting clearly makes sense" such as in 
certiorari voting (p. 350). They further conceded that they do not 
say that the Supreme Court never engages in sophisticated behavior on 
the merits. Rather, given the difficulty of passing legislation in Congress, 
given the Supreme Court's rather incomplete information about congres-
sional preferences, the salience of Court decisions to members of Con-
gress, and the short-lived duration of whatever Congress the Court is 
facing, we argue that the Court virtually never defers to presumed con-
gressional preferences in the first instance. Rather, the justices will rou-
tinely vote their sincere preferences. If and when Congress ever mounts a 
clear and imminent threat to the Court's institutional policy-making 
powers, then and only then will the Court respond and back down. But 
given the extraordinary difficulty of striking at the Court's powers, such 
times will be rare, indeed. (p. 350 n.102) 
The authors claim the justices will do whatever the system allows them 
to do, but this claim is consistent with a rational-choice conception of 
justices as trying to do just that. 
Fourth, rational-choice theorists have defined some critically 
important variables problematically. For instance, Epstein and King 
have suggested that an appropriate proxy for measuring a judge's 
ideology is the ideologies of sponsoring senators.49 As Dean Richard 
Revesz has shown, this proxy is flawed, because district court appoint-
ees have sponsoring senators, while nominees to appellate judgeships 
tend only occasionally to have sponsors and those appointed in the 
District of Columbia rarely do.50 Supreme Court nominees are even 
less likely than appellate judges to owe their appointments to a single 
senator. 
An even bigger problem with the authors' critique of rational-
choice models is its inability to explain data that can be explained on 
the basis of the postpositivist model of the Court. Thus, a closer look 
at the authors' critique of this other model is in order. 
C. Postpositivism 
The major problem with the authors' critique of postpositivism is 
that they do not analyze it in its strongest form. For example, they fail 
to acknowledge that postpositivists have ample empirical data to 
support their conception of judges as trying to "make the best decision 
possible in light of [their) training and sense of professional obliga-
49. Epstein & King, supra note 43, at 83-84. 
50. Richard L. Revesz, A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
169, 180-83 (2002). 
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tion. "51 The critical assumption of institutionalists like the postpositiv-
ists is that understanding the judicial process requires appreciating the 
implications of the specific institutional context within which justices 
operate. Fundamental to this project is accepting that this context has 
substantive effects, while attitudinalists and rational-choice theorists 
believe it largely- if not wholly- operates as a cipher. 
Postpositivists have amassed an impressive amount of empirical 
support for their claim that structure shapes judicial decisionmaking. 
Though not strictly falsifiable, the evidence can be assessed on the 
bases of logic, experience, and history. Howard Gillman amply 
summarizes it.52 This research poses a problem for the critique of the 
postpositivist model because, as Gillman explains, it has "[ a]ll [been] 
written by scholars who were mindful of the debates in the literature 
about legal versus personal influences on decision making, and all 
attempted to show how the judges' expressed beliefs and patterns of 
behavior could only be explained with reference to distinctive legal 
norms. "53 The authors have yet to make a rejoinder to this copious 
research except to dismiss it as not being falsifiable and as not allow-
ing for the likelihood that justices will simply use whatever reasoning 
they can muster to support the outcomes they prefer. The rejoinder 
falls flat because the massive evidence supporting postpositivism flatly 
contradicts the attitudinal model on perfectly reasonable grounds. 54 
III. THE LIMITS OF THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
The bulk of the authors' revised treatise sets forth the data 
supporting the attitudinal model. The data fail, however, to support 
the attitudinal model nearly as much as the authors think. There are 
three significant problems with the model's empirical support, each of 
which I discuss below. 
51. P. 432 (quoting Gillman, supra note 13, at 486). 
52. Gillman describes research on the Court's due process and commerce clause deci-
sions from the late nineteenth century to the New Deal era, the Warren Court's failure to 
constitutionalize welfare rights, the developments of modern free speech and death penalty 
jurisprudence, and the certiorari process. Gillman, supra note 13, at 490-91. 
53. /d. at 491. 
54. See id. at 492: 
the major difference [between the empirical work of postpositivists and Spaeth and Segal's] 
seems to be that Spaeth and Segal create what some legalists would consider a fairly artificial 
standard for what should count as a legal frame of mind (gravitate toward precedents from 
which you dissented) while these other scholars made it a focused object of their research to 
understand and reconstruct the actual legal standards under which these judges were oper-
ating. 
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A. Empirical Dilemmas 
The major problem with the attitudinal model's empirical support 
is the authors' objectification of subjective preferences and phenom-
ena. While there are clearly some objective facts in constitutional law 
(for example, the constitutional text, the winners and losers of law-
suits, and the justices' and their nominating presidents' respective par-
ties) many other factors are subjective, including the characterization 
of a justice's interpretive methodology or ideology. Reducing these to 
quantifiable terms, much less to the rigors of scientific measurement, 
is futile. Richard Posner (to whose critique of legal reasoning they 
defer55) has condemned empirical analysis of the sort employed by the 
authors as "soft" and unlike the methods of a "hard" field such as 
physics in which theorists reason to "divergent conclusions from 
shared premises. "56 The authors search in vain for such premises. 
Ironically, legal scholars' lack of consensus on explanations for the 
Court's decisions or criteria for evaluating them is more of a problem 
for the authors than legal scholars. 
The quest to objectify subjective preferences stumbles at almost 
every turn. For instance, one problem with the authors' original work 
was the circularity of their research - they had determined justices' 
attitudes by their votes and then explained their votes by their atti-
tudes. To get around this problem, the authors measure judicial atti-
tudes by four major newspapers' editorials at the times of their ap-
pointments and through the justices' earlier votes that are validated 
through the predictions of later votes (p. 321). Instead of relying on 
the Court's opinions for the facts of a case, they obtain them from 
lower-court records. 
The external sources the authors have found to validate justices' 
ideologies are themselves problematic. First, it is unclear why newspa-
per editorials should be taken as neutral on this matter. It is possible 
(and many people believe) newspapers have ideological agendas, 
which will influence their analyses of the justices. Second, the authors' 
objective should not just be to find an external source for defining a 
justice's ideology but to find an external source on whose authority 
most experts can agree. If there are no experts or they cannot agree on 
a source, the futility of the research is all the more apparent. Third, 
the reliance on the past votes of lower-court judges is problematic 
because many Supreme Court nominees have never served, or served 
only briefly, as lower-court judges.57 The authors offer no substitute 
55. See pp. 85, 93. 
56. RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, 
IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON 240 (1999). 
57. Seep. 182 ("93 of the 147 nominees (63 percent) [to the Court] have occupied judi-
cial positions" prior to their appointments.). 
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for measuring these justices' ideology. Fourth, the authors do not 
account for the fact that state and federal judges have had different 
caseloads and exposures to the questions they are likely to face on the 
Court. At the very least, the authors need to account for these differ-
ences in determining the relevance of past votes to possible future 
voting on the Court. Moreover, assessing justices' likely behavior 
based on their votes as lower-court judges is dubious because lower-
court judges are obliged to follow Supreme Court precedents justices 
are free to question.58 Fifth, it is odd for the authors to rely on lower-
court records of the facts of a case because these judges, too, might be 
driven by their ideological preferences and thus their rendition of the 
facts might not be neutral. 
Beyond these problems, there are other difficulties with the attitu-
dinal model's empirical support. First, the authors have yet to compile 
empirical support for their claims about the constraining power of 
sources other than precedent. Without such support, the authors risk 
appearing hypercritical. The anecdotal evidence that they amass on 
the indeterminacy of these other sources does not meet their exacting 
standards. 
Even worse for their model, the authors' data show there is 
virtually no realm in which the justices' votes . perfectly track their 
ideological preferences. Indeed, they repeatedly acknowledge 
throughout their book that their data on the Court's practices and 
decisions show that the attitudinal model largely explains outcomes.59 
The concession reflects the authors' laudable preference for candor, 
but it undercuts their insistence on the superiority of the attitudinal 
model. 
Second, the authors' research on whether justices follow prece-
dents to which they dissented is dubious. There is no basis for believ-
ing justices should follow precedents to which they dissented. The 
same obligation that lower-court judges have to obey Supreme Court 
precedent does not extend to the Court's dissenters; they are not 
considered subordinate in any way to their colleagues and thus have 
no obligation to accept their colleagues' positions. There is, in other 
words, no norm that obligates justices to defer to precedents to which 
they dissented. The legal model allows dissent. 
Moreover, the label "preferentialist" used to describe the attitudes 
of the justices who dissented to an original precedent60 is misleading. 
The label suggests these justices reject precedents in favor of their 
personal preferences and not on the basis of legal considerations. Yet, 
58. Cf Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Supreme Court Precedents?, 
46 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1994) (analyzing inter alia, the conventional arguments for lower 
courts to follow Supreme Court precedents). 
59. See, e.g., pp. 76, 114, 176, 177,290,301-02,311,319,350,367,378,399,404. 
60. See pp. 296-97. 
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there is no proof to support this supposition. In fact, the most common 
explanation for the justices' failures to follow precedents to which they 
dissented is their preference to follow other precedents. 
Third, the authors insist implausibly that the Court is the most 
important policymaker in our constitutional system.61 The Court 
upholds rather than overturns policies in most cases. In these cases, 
the policies that get implemented reflect the preferences of national 
political leaders rather than those of the justices. If one were to 
compile a list of the most significant statutes enacted by the Congress 
over the past fifty years,62 it would not reflect any matter over which 
the Court has exercised any meaningful influence. 
Fourth, the authors set up an impossible standard to meet. The 
authors admittedly predict only 77% of the Court's decisions (p. 319). 
This is not a bad rate; it leaves, however, a substantial minority of 
cases that the model promises to, but does not,'explain. 
Fifth, the authors assume the orlly preference justices are inter~ 
ested in maximizing is influence over policymaking. Justices, however, 
have many interests they wish to maximize. Unfortunately, the authors 
reject every one other than influencing policy because the others 
cannot be objectively verified. A conventional assumption of 
economics that individuals seek to maximize wealth is largely inappli~ 
cable to federal judges whose salaries are fixed and tenure is secure.63 
A justice cannot get a better salary by doing a better job as a justice. 
She may, however, try to maximize other interests, including preserv-
ing leisure time, desire for prestige, promoting the public interest, 
avoiding having their decisions overturned; or enhancing reputation. 
[P]ersonal dislike of a lawyer or litigant, gratitude to the appointing 
authorities, desire for advancement, irritation with or even a desire to 
undermine a judicial colleague or subordinate, willingness to trade votes, 
desire to be on good terms with colleagues, not wanting to disagree with 
people one likes or respects, fear for personal safety, fear of ridicule, re-
luctance to offend one's spouse or close friends, and racial or class soli-
darity64 
may also represent interests Justices maximize. Additionally, justices 
might seek to maximize their sense of duty, for example, trying to 
make the best decision in light of the relevant legal materials. These 
different interests suggest the possibility that the search for a single, 
universal maximand is futile. 
61. Seep. 177 ("If a choice were to be made among President, Congress, and Court as to 
which branch should rule, we continue to put our money on the justices."). 
62. l attribute this test of the attitudinal model to Mark Graber, who suggested it to me. 
63. See U.S. CONST. art. III.§ l. 
64. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 130-31 (1995). 
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Lastly, attitudinalists have conceded the relevance of "context," or 
the facts of a given case, to a judicial decision.65 This concession effec-
tively admits the relevance of precedent as a constraint on justices, 
because the particular facts of a case are important for providing the 
grounds on which justices distinguish or analogize between cases. 
B. The Problem of Constitutional Change 
Constitutional change, in the short and long terms, poses serious 
difficulties for the attitudinal model. First, the attitudinal model is 
based in part on the presumption that individual justices have fixed 
ideological preferences at the start of their respective tenures. Fixed 
preferences ought to be relatively easy to measure. If they shift, how-
ever, there would be no tangible measure of a justice's ideology 
against which to assess her subsequent decisions. Unfortunately, there 
are no data confirming that justices have fixed preferences at the out-
set of their respective appointments. The search for these fixed prefer-
ences often leads the authors around in circles. 
This problem is evident in the authors' treatment of John Marshall. 
They accept the misconception of Marshall as dominating his Court 
intellectually to further the Federalist Party's policy preferences.66 
They fail to acknowledge, much less appreciate, the fact that nearly all 
of Marshall's constitutional opinions were delivered for a Court with a 
hand-picked Jeffersonian majority on it. Most of the justices with 
whom Marshall served were chosen because of their antipathy towards 
Federalist policies and sympathy towards the Jeffersonian constitu-
tional vision.67 Thus, the Court, with Marshall as Chief Justice, repudi-
ated Federalist preferences that the Constitution be construed rigor-
ously with any ambiguities in its language resolved according to the 
"rule of choosing the meaning that best comported with the objects, or 
purposes, of the Constitution as stated in the Preamble";68 that our 
65. Seep. 319 ("Facts obviously affect the decisions of the Supreme Court .... "). 
66. See p. 117 ("Unquestionably, John Marshall dominated his Court as no other justice 
has."). For the contrary viewpoint, see R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE 
HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT 413 (2001) (arguing that the unanimity achieved 
during Marshall's tenure as Chief Justice was not so much a function of his superior intelli-
gence as a reflection of his willingness to compromise): 
By bending a little, Marshall preserved a lot. ... [I]t was flexibility, along with tactical savvy 
that permitted Marshall to salvage so much of his constitutional nationalism in an age hostile 
to it. It's an unprovable counterfactual statement to say that Marshall's timely strategic re-
treat foiled his enemies. but it's a good guess that it did. 
For more critical analysis of misconceptions about Marshall, see Michael J. Gerhardt, 
The Lives of John Marshall, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1399 (2002). 
67. Republican appointees filled 10 of the 11 vacancies arising on the Court during Mar-
shall's tenure. 
68. William Winslow Crosskey, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in MR. JUSTICE 3 (Allison 
Dunham & Philip B. Kurland eds., 1964 ). 
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Constitution is not one of enumerated powers but rather invests the 
Congress with "a general lawmaking authority for all the objects of the 
government that the Preamble of the Constitution states";69 that the 
"United States formed a single nation as to 'all commercial regula-
tions' ";70 and that the common law was part of the law of the United 
States and thus allowed for Supreme Court supremacy over the state 
courts with respect to all questions of state law and common law.71 The 
attitudinal model cannot explain why Marshall abdicated these 
strongly held Federalist views as Chief Justice. 
Moreover, some justices' attitudes seem to shift. The authors sug-
gest Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter each became more "lib-
eral" over time, while Justice White became more "conservative" over 
time (p. 218). Similarly, the authors accept the conventional account 
that in 1937 Owen Roberts and Charles Evans Hughes switched from 
being "conservative" to joining the "liberals to uphold" the constitu-
tional foundations of progressive economic regulations (p. 140). The 
problem with these characterizations - even if they were true72 -
is that the attitudinal model cannot explain the shifts. If justices' 
ideological preferences change, the model has to attribute the changes 
to exogenous factors. Yet, the attitudinal model posits none for the 
specific changes mentioned by the authors or the general phenomenon 
of shifting judicial preferences. 
Second, the attitudinal model is no more useful for explaining why 
the ideological categories to which it assigns justices shift over time. 
The authors gloss over shifts in the meanings of these categories, 
merely defining them on the extent to which they favor or support 
policies that are popularly viewed as liberal or conservative.73 If, how-
ever, the meanings of these categories shift, the model cannot explain 
why. The authors' categorization of ideologies cannot account for, and 
is in fact undermined by, ideological drift, which is the phenomenon 
by which a view generally associated with one political faction is over 
time appropriated by or becomes associated with a different one.74 
Thus, aggressive judicial review might in one period appear to be 
liberal, while in another it might appear to be conservative. The fact 
that such alterations occur is beyond doubt, even assuming particular 
justices' attitudes are fixed. 
69. !d. at 12. 
70. /d. at 18. 
71. The Court rejected this view in Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). 
72. For a contrary perspective, see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION 
BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 
(1993). 
73. See p. 323. 
74. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Rhetoric of Judicial Critique: From Judicial Restraint to 
the Virtual Bill of Rights, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 585,637-38 (2002). 
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Examining the public perceptions of John Marshall, Roger Taney, 
and Felix Frankfurter provides some illumination. Marshall was 
known throughout much of his career, particularly on the bench, as 
overseeing a Court that became a "fortress of conservatism,"75 because 
decisions he joined expanded national power at the expense of state 
sovereignty and upheld private-property rights at the expense of social 
and economic reform.76 Chief Justice Taney, on the other hand, exem-
plified many liberals of his day, because of his respect for popular de-
mocracy and states' governmental and social reforms.77 It is because of 
ideological drift that contemporary liberals find something in common 
with Marshall and not Taney. 
In contrast, Frankfurter was the strongest advocate for judicial 
restraint during his twenty-two-year tenure on the Court. Praised by 
liberals for his staunch defense of judicial restraint in evaluating 
progressive economic regulations through his first decade on the 
Court, Frankfurter was upset to find that in the late 1940s and early 
1950s liberals were denouncing him. 
Now, when he advocated judicial restraint, he was attacked by those very 
liberals [who had once praised him]. In his earlier years, pillars of the le-
gal community like Henry Stimson, Emory Buckner, and Charles 
Burlingham praised him. Now, they were either dead or silent .... [I]n 
the Truman years, there was little White House contact. Frankfurter had 
never believed he was "the single most influential man" in Washington 
but sometimes he had enjoyed the notoriety. Now there was no more no-
toriety; he was only one of nine, and one under increasing criticism from 
those once his friends.78 
In subsequent years, Frankfurter's status as a liberal has continued to 
fade away. 
Third, the attitudinal model cannot fully explain stability in consti-
tutional doctrine. The authors insist that justices will not vote against 
the interests of the governing political coalition, but the governing 
political coalition sometimes does not get the change(s) it wants. The 
authors ignore this fact in their political history of the Court, which is 
filled with inexplicable periods in which new justices failed to alter 
constitutional doctrine to the extent preferred by the political forces 
75. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 322 (1946). 
76. See CARL BRENT SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY 350 (1935) ("The popularity of John 
Marshall ... and the prestige acquired by the Supreme Court during his regime, resulted 
largely from the fact that he wrote into constitutional law the beliefs and prejudices of a 
class, the class, incidentally, from whose records and in terms of whose judgments most of 
the history of the period has been written. Outside of that class he and his court were any-
thing but popular .... "). 
77. See Carl Brent Swisher, Mr. Chief Justice Taney, in MR. JUSTICE, supra note 68, at 
35. 
78. LEONARD BAKER. BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER: A DUAL BIOGRAPHY 456 
(1984). 
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responsible for their appointments.79 Indeed, there are many areas in 
which judicial closure is achieved, in spite of the fact that many justices 
might personally disagree with the position(s) reached.80 A striking re-
cent example is Dickerson v. United States,81 the Court's seven to two 
decision, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, reaffirming 
Miranda v. Arizona82 in spite of a longstanding effort by Republicans 
to dismantle Miranda. 
Fourth, the attitudinal model does not address the phenomenon of 
institutional path dependence. A decision has path dependency if it 
compels or forces judges to forego or accept other choices.83 While 
attitudinalists claim precedents do not generate any path dependency 
in constitutional law, 
[i]nstitutions are relatively persistent, and thus both carry forward in 
time past political decisions and mediate the effects of new political deci-
sions. The creation of institutions closes off options by making it more 
costly to reverse course, by differentially distributing resources, and by 
tying interests and identities to the status quo. [Moreover,] the persis-
tence of institutions across time can foster political crises and change as 
they enter radically changed social environments or abrade discordant 
institutions.84 
The attitudinal model does not address the link between constitutional 
design and social or political change. As the next Part suggests, this 
link is just one area in which the authors at the very least should do 
further research to refine their model. 
IV. RETHINKING THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
The attitudinal model is based in part on the presumption of a 
coherent distinction between the external and internal perspectives of 
the Supreme Court. There is, however, no such neat distinction. In the 
real world of the law, judicial decisions are not made in a vacuum. 
Justices operate not only with formal strictures (such as laws forbid-
79. See pp. 118-19, 130,132-33,135, 138,153, 156,159. 
80. These decisions include incorporating most of the Bill of Rights into the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, upholding the constitutionality of legal tender, 
upholding the constitutionality of congressional regulation of private economic activity, up-
holding abortion rights for more than a decade, and upholding the constitutional founda-
tions of the New Deal and the Great Society. 
81. 530 u.s. 428 (2000). 
82. 384 u.s. 436 (1966). 
83. See Keith E. Whittington, Once More unto the Breach: PostBehavioralist Ap-
proaches to Judicial Politics, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 601, 617 (2000) (reviewing SUPREME 
COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES (Cornell W. Clayton & 
Howard Gillman eds., 1999); THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW 
INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton eds., 1999)) 
(internal citations omitted). 
84. Whittington, supra note 83, at 616. 
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ding bribery), procedural requirements, and norms, but also within a 
conceptual framework. Together, these elements constitute the special 
institutional environment within which justices decide cases. In recent 
years, legal scholars and political scientists have studied the specific 
ways in which this environment shapes judicial decisions. Because 
these studies support other models, they pose serious problems for the 
attitudinal model. Attitudinalists have not yet addressed either these 
problems or the implications of these studies for future research on 
the Court. 
A. Supreme Court Selection 
In compiling data on Supreme Court selection, the authors 
discount the strength of the relationship between justices' back-
grounds and their attitudes. Other scholars have, however, drawn in-
teresting conclusions about this relationship from simple bivariant 
analyses. For instance, Richard Lazarus examined the correlation be-
tween justices' votes in cases involving environmental law and their 
love of the outdoors or personal involvement in activities that would 
familiarize them with the importance of environmental protection 
(such as hiking, hunting, and fishing).85 More recently, Tracey George 
suggested that former academics show the greatest skepticism about 
or willingness to question doctrine.86 Hence, she proposes that a presi-
dent who wants to appoint a justice interested in challenging accepted 
doctrine should consider leading academics as possible appointees. In 
addition, Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, and Andrew Martin suggested 
that over the past two decades prior judicial experience has become a 
norm in Supreme Court selection.87 On their view, this norm has 
evolved at the expense of greater diversity in the backgrounds and 
experiences of the justices, which could improve the quality of the 
Court's decisions.88 These studies should spur inquiries into why some 
justices vote consistently with their backgrounds and others do not. 
Discounting presidential selection criteria presents a bigger prob-
lem for the authors. David Yalof's study of Supreme Court selection 
shows presidents generally have very specific criteria in mind when 
choosing Supreme Court nominees.89 This has been particularly true 
85. Richard 1. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental About Environmental Law in 
the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703 (2000). 
86. Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9 (2001). 
87. Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and Its Consequences for 
Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L. REV. 903 (2003). 
88. This research is hardly without problems. For instance, Supreme Court selection is 
rarely based on a single factor, such as background, while persons with backgrounds unlike 
those on the Court might still share those justices' methodological commitments or attitudes. 
89. DAVID ALISTAIR Y ALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE 
SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (1999). 
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for Republican presidents over the past two decades. President 
George W. Bush, who has not had the opportunity to nominate any-
one to the Supreme Court, has chosen non-Supreme Court judicial 
nominees thus far pursuant to careful ideological screening.90 While 
each president's selection criteria might not explain senators' concep-
tions of or reactions to particular nominations,91 they represent the 
keenest insights on justices' likely ideology at the outset of their 
respective tenures. Rather than look for a proxy for a justice's ideol-
ogy based on presidents' and senators' attitudes, the authors should 
consider testing a justice's votes against selection criteria. A correlat-
ing pattern would support their model, while the absence of such a 
pattern would require explanation. 
B. Postpositivists on Precedent 
There is considerable postpositivist research that the authors do 
not address. First, Gillman has summarized postpositivist research on 
precedent that supports the legal rather than the attitudinal model.92 
This research obliges the authors to explain why the techniques em-
ployed in these studies are flawed (though they are common among 
social scientists) or modify their conception of the legal model 
accordingly. 
Second, Keith Whittington has proposed research on "better inte-
gration" of the different models of the Supreme Court.93 It would en-
tail addressing the justices' sense of mission, the phenomenon of "Law 
Talk"; "the extent to which judicial decision making is dependent on 
prior cognitive maps that shape how the justices approach a given case 
90. See, e.g., Kris Axtman, The Case of Judges v. Ideology, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR 
(Boston), Jan. 23, 2003, at 2; Hans S. Nichols, White House Wishes, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, 
Jan.6,2003,at18. 
91. Other research suggests that in times of divided government, institutional considera-
tions (such as consulting with congressional leaders) have been more important in Supreme 
Court selection than they have when the President's party controls the Senate. See, e.g., 
Christine L. Nemacheck & Rachel P. Caulfield, Giving Advice: Congressional Lobbying in 
Supreme Court Selection from 1930 to 1992, Presentation to the Midwest Political Science 
Association (Apr. 12, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). In the latter cir-
cumstances, presidents have been relatively free to make choices based primarily on their 
preferred criteria. 
92. The authors fail to address, inter alia, recent research on "the use of precedent by 
lawyers in case briefs and by justices in conference discussions, where discussion of legal ma-
terials cannot be merely a matter of public relations"; "precedential effects on other [lower] 
courts"; "judicial practices, such as writing concurring and dissenting opinions (forms of be-
havior that are not about policymaking), inviting legislative overrides, and patterns of case 
selection during the cert-granting process"; and "how distinctive jurisprudential categories 
or doctrines have influenced voting and opinion writing on the Supreme Court." Gillman, 
supra note 13, at 480-81 (internal citations omitted). 
93. Whittington, supra note 83, at 632. For a similar approach to analyzing how the 
court operates, see Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Su-
preme Court Decisionmaking, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1437 (2001). 
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and imagine available choices"; "how the law maintains itself over 
time"; and "the preconditions of legal change."94 He lauds other 
scholars for demonstrating 
· the value of moving beyond vote counting and individual decisions and 
examining the role that the Court plays in the American political system 
as a whole. In doing so, they point to the interpenetration of law and 
politics and the difficulty of regarding them as either separate spheres or 
trying to collapse one category into another. Certainly work by interpre-
tive institutionalists ... [has] been deeply concerned with strategic ac-
tion. Recent work by rational choice scholars similarly points the way 
toward an integration of analysis of strategic judicial behavior and the 
production and influence of the law.95 
Whittington suggests institutional analysis provides a bridge between 
"empirically minded political scientists interested in the law" such as 
Spaeth and Segal and other scholars.96 He explains that "[t)he exami-
nation of judicial decision making is already benefiting from efforts to 
link the courts to other political and social actors and to situate the 
judiciary within a nested set of discourses and social practices."97 
Clarifying this link will elucidate "the many ways power is exercised 
both inside the Court and out. "9R · 
Third, the authors do not address Deborah Gruenfeld's work on 
group dynamics within the Court. In one study, she examined the 
"integrative complexity" of the justices in majority and minority 
opinions, i.e., she studied the extent to which being in the majority or 
dissent pressured the justices to expand their opinions to include some 
discussion of opposing views.99 Her findings supported a "status-
contingency model, which predicts higher levels of [integrative] com-
plexity among members of majority factions [on the Court] than 
among members of either minority factions or unanimous groups 
independent[] of the ideological contents of their views." 100 In another 
study, she examined the extent to which a justice's status, in the 
majority or dissent, shaped her integrative complexity in decisions to 
uphold or overturn precedent. Gruenfeld and her coauthor found that 
"justices writing on behalf of decisions to uphold precedent exhibited 
greater integrative complexity than did justices writing on behalf of 
decisions to overturn precedent, but this effect was stronger for the 
94. Whittington, supra note 83, at 628. 
95. /d. at 630-31 (internal citations omitted). 
96. /d. at 631. 
97. /d. at 631. 
98. !d. 
99. Deborah H. Gruenfeld, Status, Ideology, and Integrative Complexity on the U.S. Su-
preme Court: Rethinking the Politics of Political Decision Making, 68 J. PERSONALITY & 
Soc. PSYCHOL. 5 (1995). 
100. !d. at 5. 
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authors of majority than minority opinions." 101 These findings support 
the legal rather than the attitudinal model. · ., · 
Fourth, Dean Revesz has shown that two other factors ignored or 
discounted by rational-choice theorists influence outcomes, namely, 
panel compositions (i.e., who sits with whom) and case selection (i.e., 
litigants' choices about which cases not to settle but rather to take all 
the way up through the court system).102 These findings undermine the 
attitudinal claim that ideology is the driving force of all judicial deci-
sions. 
C. Retesting the Legal Model 
The new institutionalism suggests a middle position between atti-
tudinalists' profinity for empirical analysis of legal influences and legal 
scholars' skepticism of empirical testing of legal reasoning. Institution-
alists examine the patterns and practices of the Court over time to 
illuminate the constant or competing trends in its decisionmaking. 
These patterns and practices support a synthetic rather than 
unidimensional model of the Court. Below, I assess three different 
ways in which these patterns oblige the authors (and others) to per-
fect, or if necessary concede the limitations of, their model. 
1. Institutional Patterns 
The attitudinal model can be tested further by researching several 
patterns in the Court's decisions. First, one could determine how each 
justice has prioritized major sources of constitutional meaning, 
including text, structure, original intent, and precedent.103 Such 
research would clarify whether these priorities hold true across differ-
ent cases and the condition~ under which they change. Second, no data 
has been collected on the areas in which the Court has achieved 
closure or stability. Third, researchers have yet to clarify the full range 
of constitutional questions resolved by the political branches, includ-
ing foreign affairs, impeachment, appointments, vetoes, and war 
powers. Indeed, as this Review goes to press the Senate is divided over 
101. Deborah H. Gruenfeld & Jared Preston, Upending the Status Quo: Cognitive Com-
plexity in U.S. Stqirem.e Court Justices Who Overturn Legal Precedent, 26 PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1013, 1013 (2000). 
102. See Revesz, supra note 50, at 175-77. Of course, one problem with this study is that 
it merely measures how different panels have decided different cases. No single case is ever 
decided by more than one court much less by multiple panels with different compositions. 
103. See, e.g., Judicial Nominations, Filibusters, and the Constitution: When a Majority is 
Denied Its Right to Consent: Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. on the Constitution of the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (special hearing on the constitutionality 
of the filibuster); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Many Faces of "Judicial Restraint," 1993 PUB. 
L. REV. 3 (differentiating conservative justices based on their respective prioritizing of dif-
ferent sources). 
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one such issue: the constitutionality of the filibuster, particularly as 
applied to judicial nominations. 104 Fourth, scholars should explore 
whether some models explain some votes or decisions better than oth-
ers.105 This research would clarify the utility of each model. 
2. The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent 
The authors ignore how a precedent's form shapes its potential to 
constrain. The justices' training and duties narrow their options for 
packaging their decisions; they frame their judgments as rules or stan-
dards. Rules and standards constrain judicial decisionmaking differ-
ently, and these differences explain precedents' limited constraint on 
the Court's decisions. 
By design, rules constrain choices more than standards. 106 Rules 
constitute broad, inflexible principles that provide clear notice to 
those to whom they apply and that allow minimal discretion from 
those charged with implementing them. A speed limit is a prime 
example. It sets forth the maximum speed at which someone may 
travel legally. Anyone who exceeds the limit violates the law. The law 
allows no exceptions. The only discretion permitted by the law is 
measuring the speed at which someone has been driving against the 
maximum allowed to determine compliance. 
The more absolutist the rule declared by the Supreme Court the 
more strongly it imposes path dependency on the law. A good exam-
ple is the rule that Justice Scalia proposes in racial-discrimination 
cases.107 His rule would preclude almost all racial preferences. It 
permits virtually no discretion for any lawmakers or justices. Such 
constraint is the objective. 
In contrast, standards set forth criteria against which governmental 
action is measured. 108 Compliance entails discretion because a 
standard's implementation requires a decisionmaker to interpret the 
104. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 103 (differentiating conservative justices based on 
their respective prioritizing of different sources). 
105. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Pre-
liminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569 (2003) (suggesting, inter alia, the possibility that 
different models explain different justices' votes). 
106. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 22 
NOVA L. REV. 743,751-53 (1998). 
107. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating categorically "government can 
never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' 
for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction"). 
108. See Sullivan, supra note 106, at 753-58. 
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criteria and to determine whether they ·have been met. Standards 
abound in constitutionallaw. 109 
To date, no one has collected data on standards and rules. The 
Court's judgments can be categorized in terms of the numbers of rules 
it has formulated; the breakdown of its rules into subject areas and in 
terms of their relative clarity; the numbers of standards; and the 
breakdown of standards into subject matter and clarity. These data 
will clarify patterns in decisionmaking, including the areas in which the 
Court frames its most restrictive judgments and those in which it 
frames its least restrictive. The research will also clarify how many 
clearly stated judgments have failed to constrain or lead to predictable 
outcomes and how many resist categorization. For instance, David 
Strauss has explained that Brown v. Board of Education110 did not 
announce a clear principle of equal protection but rather can be read 
as setting forth one of at least five different principles.111 Similarly, 
in Griswold v. Connecticut,112 the majority announced at least four 
theories supporting the outcome. Research on how many other deci-
sions declare unclear or multiple rationales would illuminate the 
precedents, claimed by Dworkin, allowing "weak" or "strong" discre-
tion.113 
3. The Multiple Functions of Precedent 
The authors' conception of precedent is so narrow that they ignore 
other functions precedent performs in constitutional adjudication. The 
attitudinal model cannot explain these functions, because they reflect 
how precedent shapes legal reasoning, argumentation, and outcomes. 
Identifying and tracking these functions should be easy. First, 
precedents legitimize fundamental aspects of constitutional argumen-
tation including sources of authority, interpretive methodologies, and 
constitutional conceptions. Precedents serve as a testing ground for 
each of these things, and how precedents deal with them shapes con-
stitutional argumentation within, and beyond, the judicial process. 
Second, precedents impose order on the legal system. They settle 
109. Just a few examples include the balancing tests the· Court employs for determining 
the reasonableness of searches or seizures, the propriety of some congressional encroach-
ments on the powers of other branches, and the Court's varying levels of scrutiny for equal 
protection disputes and free speech claims. 
110. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
111. See David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 935 (1989). 
112. 381 u.s. 479 (1965). 
113. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31-33 (1978) (distinguishing 
between an order that empowers individuals with broad latitude because it does not set forth 
any criteria a decisionmaker has to satisfy, and orders that specify criteria, which allow deci-
sionmakers to use their judgment within clear boundaries). 
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di~putes, frame judicial and other agendas, and clarify what one needs 
· to do to prevail in constitutional adjudication. Third, precedents illu-
minate and shape constitutional structure. They influence the relation-
ship between the Court and other institutions. They serve as a unique 
outlet for airing differences of opinion about constitutional matters, 
take the heat off other branches by disposing of issues they would 
prefer not to settle themselves, and shape the dialogue among the 
branches about constitutional meaning. Fourth, precedents educate 
the public, the legal community, and the world about the Court and 
the Constitution. Precedent serves as a unique medium through which 
others can view the Court and through which the Court views sources, 
its own authority, and other branches' authority. 114 Fifth, precedents 
illuminate and shape constitutional history. Some precedents are so 
closely intertwined with historical events that one cannot understand 
the events or the precedents without understanding their relationship 
-e.g., Dred Scott v. Sanford, 115 the Civil War, and Reconstruction on 
the one hand, and Bush v. Gore, the 2000 presidential election, and 
George W. Bush's presidency on the other. Precedents also reflect the 
attitudes of their respective historical periods,116 and constitute a 
chronicle of constitutional history for the Court and others. 117 Lastly, 
precedents implement constitutional values, i.e., they translate certain 
ideals into action. 118 A single precedent can serve one or more of these 
functions, all of which need to be measured for a comprehensive 
understanding of what the Court does. 
CONCLUSION 
Though legal scholars will be tempted to reject the attitudinal 
model as overly problematic, they should consider the following ques-
tions: Would they defer to any Supreme Court nomination made by 
any president? Would they approve any lower-court nominees in the 
hopes they would defer to Supreme Court precedent? Most law 
114. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term - Foreword: Leaving 
Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 6, 69-71 (1996) (describing the "expressive function" 
of the Court as announcing the values and shaping popular understanding of the contents of 
our common constitutional culture, which forms the core of the sense of political community 
that comprises the United States). 
115. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
116. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1051-
55 (1990) (arguing that our judicial precedents and traditions have shaped our current atti-
tudes and practices). 
117. Both the adversarial system and the justices' keeping an eye on each other's opin-
ions provide checks on the Court's mediations of past events by subjecting the Court's histo-
riography to close scrutiny. 
118. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 3 
(2001) (suggesting judicial review, "like the Constitution, should be regarded as a practical 
mechanism which implements a subtle form of democratic rule"). 
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professors would probably answer "no"· to both questions. These 
answers concede the relevance of at least some legal attitudes to how 
judges and justices will approach precedent, including how much they 
ought to defer to it or how they would go about creating new prece-
dent. Clarifying the extent of this relevance is a goal that law profes-
sors share with Spaeth and Segal. Whether this goal can be achieved 
depends on scholars' attitudes about the prospects for a common 
methodology to explain the Supreme Court as comprehensively as 
possible. 
